



Surety International

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In This Issue

- Indian Domestic Insurgency
- IED
- Crisis Plans
- Survey Results
- Hostile Environments

Contact Us

www.suretyinternational.com.au

enquiries@suretyinternational.com.au

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www.suretyinternational.wordpress.com

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Caven Tootell

Director

Surety International

Rydalmere Business Centre,


NSW, Australia, 1701

Tele: +61(0)2 8812 5612

Cell: +61(0)401 698 646

India's Domestic Insurgency

In the first week of April several hundred Indian insurgents from the Naxalite movement attacked a police convoy in eastern Chhattisgarh state and killed 76 armed policemen and aid responders. The Indian Maoist insurgency attack was reckoned to be the worst loss for the government in the 40 year conflict.



In 1967 a peasant uprising in the West Bengali village of Naxalbari erupted and gained Maoist support. The initial uprising was crushed by the police in 2 months. Dispersing and regrouping, under the leadership the Naxalites defined the objective of the movement as 'seizure of power through an agrarian revolution'. The strategy was the elimination of the feudal order in the countryside to free the poor from oppressive landlords. They wanted to replace the old order with an alternative one which would implement land reforms. The tactic to achieve it was through peasant guerrilla warfare against landlords and to build up resistance against the state's police force which came to help the landlords, and thus gradually set up 'liberated zones' in different parts of the country.

It is estimated today's Naxalites (taking their name from the original village) has 14,000 full-time fighters and has some control over a swathe of central and eastern India (The Red Corridor), albeit in jungle areas where the state has little traditional presence.

The Naxalites' rise can be attributed to:

- since merging their two main factions in 2004—to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist)—they have

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- minimised the internal feuding between these groups
- many grievances among tribal communities who live in the poorer eastern states, unaddressed by the central government, have provided them with support.
- rapid economic growth in this region, especially in mining, has given the Naxalites new targets for extorting cash, including foreign and state-owned mining companies.

The response by the government has been poor. In 2006 the Prime Minister, described the insurgency as India's "single biggest internal-security challenge"— but most state governments have taken little concrete action. The reason for this is complex within the Indian context - few politicians seemed to share the alarm. Political expediency also plays a part: some ministers garner support from the guerrillas.

The worst-affected states are also among those with governance issues. An example of governance failure is Chhattisgarh's counterinsurgency ploy, the arming of an anti-Maoist tribal militia known as Salwa Judum. It displaced over 50,000 villagers and which in turn acted as a recruiting source for the Naxalites. Properly trained state-level officers, who know the local language and conditions, have a much better counterinsurgency record. The best example is in Andhra Pradesh where this appears to have greatly weakened the insurgency.



This latest attack is a strong response to the central government's latest peace talks. Encouraged by a Maoist ceasefire proposal, India's home minister, has repeatedly declared the

government ready to talk—provided the insurgents first lay down their arms.

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

There have been and continue to be Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) disguised as innocuous or even attractive items to lure an unsuspecting or situationally unaware targets to it.

In a hostile environment you must constantly question why things are positioned as they are. A simple example is the westerner's desire for 'cleanliness' and the need to 'pick up' rubbish near where we live and work. It would not be long before insurgents would start to emplace IED amongst rubbish to be activated when someone stops to pick up the trash.

There are some indicators of an IED – however, extreme caution and a sense of wariness must always drive your actions. These could be;

- Electrical wires, batteries, or other items seemingly out of place.
- Isolated boxes and containers near public routes.
- Abandoned vehicles, military equipment, weapons.
- Attractive items such as jewellery or mobile phones lying near places which can conceal wires or explosives
- Disturbed soil.

The search and clearance of IED or suspect areas should only ever be done by someone with expert knowledge. The procedures require complex, specialised equipment and training.

For an INGO situation, a suspected IED must be reported to the proper authorities, the area cleared to a safe distance and warnings posted to all staff and public. Also be aware, whoever set the device may be watching and it could be a command detonated device – that is this person will initiate detonation by cell phone, command wire etc.

Crisis Plans

It is Friday night, and you working alone in your office. Local staff have gone home, and most expats are out and about relaxing. You hear gunfire close to your compound along with what appear to be grenade explosions.

The security of your staff, compound and assets are at risk and you are the senior project person in the compound.

What do you do? Do you know the crisis management plan processes?

- Where are the emergency contact numbers?
- Where are your friends and co-workers – are they safe where they are? Or should they move?

- Do you need to go to a safe location?
- Is the someone or some security organisation you need to call?
- What has to be secured?
- Is your current security appropriate and competent to deal with an escalating situation?
- Do you have a documented evacuation plan with triggers laid out to assist in the decision making process?

If you aren't fully briefed and aware of what to do, your life and those you work with could be at serious risk.

Often there is too much competition for staff time, energy, and resources and Crisis and Emergency preparedness is not at the top of the list of priorities—until it is too late. The threat to you and your staff can be drastically altered by maintaining and practising an effective preparedness and response program.

Security Survey Results

Results of our international security survey conducted. In all over 2,500 addressees were invited with around a 35% response rate, which we are exceptionally pleased with.

Percentage results of responses have been rounded to the nearest percentile, as well as response typing errors have been removed after considerable and careful examination.

If any addressee wishes to learn more of the results or has questions on it please do not hesitate to contact us.

Probably the most alarming message we learnt from the survey and responses was the relatively high number of No answers. If this is true then these organisations are leaving themselves open to possible serious issues should the worst case scenario play out.

1) Does your organisation have a Crisis Management Plan?

Yes **72%** No **28%**

2) Do you have a dependable method, in a crisis, of locating and determining the exact position of all staff and vehicles?

Yes **63%** No **37%**

3) Does your organisation have a Kidnap Response Plan and Kidnap Avoidance Programme?

Yes **53%** No **37%** Unsure **10%**

4) Has every compound of your organisation been assessed for security risk?

Yes **75%** No **25%**

5) Does your organisation have access to credible intelligence estimates and information for your operating locations?

Yes **75%** No **13%** Unsure **12%**

6) Does your organisation have an approved and promulgated set of Standard Operating Procedures to cover all likely incidents?

Yes **64%** No **24%** Unsure **12%**

7) Does your organisation's insurance coverage require an annual independent risk assessment?

Yes **39%** No **37%** Unsure **24%**

8) Does your organisation have a security focused Travel Plan for use on local transport facilities?

Yes **87%** No **13%**

9) Does your organisation have an Asset Register which is regularly maintained?

Yes **62%** No **26%** Unsure **12%**

10) Does your organisation have a Risk Register to record all risks and mitigation strategies which affect your staff, assets, infrastructure, images etc.?

Yes **75%** No **12%** Unsure **13%**


11) Have these Plans and documentation been briefed to all staff and reassessed in the past 12 months?

Yes **50%** No **37%** Unsure **13%**

Hostile Environment Awareness

Hostile Environment Awareness training is a method to enhance your personal safety awareness whilst working in countries where the security situation is more fraught with danger than where your staff live and to provide you with the knowledge to deal with situations you may encounter.

It is a way for you and your staff to take ownership of personal security, though;

- 
- Minimising your profile
 - Understanding the threat
 - Avoidance of routine
 - Contingency planning
 - Information control

One of the best and usually easiest methods is to hold regular training days (3-5 days) for staff in country to make them aware of issues and methods they can use to protect themselves.
